David Sedney, US deputy assistant secretary of defence for Pakistan and Afghanistan, has admitted that tensions between Washington and Islamabad are heightening over plans for the agency. He added that as soon as the US has ‘exact targeting information’, it will be passed on to Pakistan, and Islamabad’s cooperation is expected. – Photo by Reuters.
The stage is being set for a military operation in North Waziristan, whether the Pakistani establishment likes it or not. American military heavyweights have urged the government and army to expand operations into the tribal agency, and refusals to do so have not been taken lightly.
More than US demands to eliminate the Quetta shura, and certainly more than the South Waziristan operation, the possibility of an operation in North Waziristan raises fundamental questions about the course of the US-Pakistan partnership in the war against terror. Are we fighting our war, or their war? In either case, what does victory look like? And can there be a long-term solution to militancy in this region?
For the moment, President Asif Zardari has refused to expand military operations into North Waziristan. But the US is not taking no for an answer. David Sedney, US deputy assistant secretary of defence for Pakistan and Afghanistan, has admitted that tensions between Washington and Islamabad are heightening over plans for the agency. He added that as soon as the US has ‘exact targeting information’, it will be passed on to Pakistan — and Islamabad’s cooperation is expected.
Separately, the US has stepped up drone attacks in North Waziristan; 12 of the last 15 strikes have targeted the agency. This activity may leave Pakistan with no option but to wage an offensive. After all, this summer, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the Taliban commander in North Waziristan, called off a peace deal with the government and launched several attacks against Frontier Corps personnel owing to military incursions and ramped up drone attacks. More surgical strikes — with Pakistani complicity — could cause him to turn anti-government once again. And this time, he may extend attacks against Pakistani security forces beyond the tribal belt.
In the short term, an offensive in North Waziristan is inadvisable for several reasons: The Pakistan Army is already stretched thin across the tribal areas and the onset of winter means harsh fighting conditions. Many Taliban fleeing the South Waziristan operation sought refuge in North Waziristan, bolstering militant ranks there. Pakistani intelligence officials have also admitted that North Waziristan is something of an intel ‘black hole’. In recent weeks, the Taliban have purged their ranks of anyone suspected of being an informer; in North Waziristan alone, the agencies have lost 30 undercover operatives.
Moreover, Bahadur’s fighters and the Haqqani network, which is based in North Waziristan, pose no direct threat to the Pakistani government and security establishment — the former is primarily interested in maintaining territorial control while the latter targets coalition forces in Afghanistan. During the recent operation in South Waziristan, the northern agency largely stuck to its deal with our army to maintain neutrality and permit the safe passage of military convoys.
In the light of this status quo, US demands for Pakistan to move into North Waziristan could be critiqued for betraying a double standard. In Afghanistan, the US has emphasised a shift towards counterinsurgency (COIN). The idea is to minimise civilian casualties, win public support and differentiate between ‘good’ (manageable, reconcilable, and cooperative) and ‘bad’ (hardline, aggressive) militants.
No doubt, from the US point of view, the Haqqanis are ‘bad’ militants as they execute the most violent attacks against the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. But from a Pakistani perspective, the Haqqanis, who have decades-old relationships with Pakistani intelligence officials, and Bahadur’s men, who are amenable to peace deals, fall in the category of reconcilable, and thus, ‘good’ militants.
As recently as February 2008, when the Pakistan government and North Wazirstan-based militants struck a second peace deal (the first was signed in 2006), our authorities apparently agreed to let Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters remain in the agency as long as they ‘remained peaceful’ and did not target Pakistani security forces. For this reason, many will carefully scrutinise Pakistan’s decision to launch a military operation in North Waziristan. It will be perceived as a clarification, once and for all, about whose war against terror we’re fighting (the conundrum did not arise in the south because Mehsud Taliban fighters were targeting the Pakistani establishment). But this is the time for Pakistanis to remember that there is no such thing as a ‘good’ militant. Indeed, it is too simplistic to think that only the US stands to gain from a Pakistani offensive in North Waziristan.
The threat of retaliatory attacks in Pakistan notwithstanding, the decision to let the sleeping dogs of North Waziristan lie would be tantamount to declaring that the Pakistani state endorses terrorism. The Haqqani network boasts thousands of fighters with sway over much of Fata. Given that the US is planning its exit strategy from Afghanistan, the Pakistani army and agencies are understandably reluctant to stir a hornet’s nest that has been pliably buzzing away in recent years. Many intelligence stalwarts are counting on the Haqqanis to serve as ‘strategic assets’ when the time is ripe.
But choosing not to dismantle this network now will only allow it to flourish in the future, making terrorist training camps a permanent feature of our north-western border. Since the North Waziristan Accord of 2006, Haqqani and Bahadur’s fighters have become deeply entrenched in the tribal agency. They run a parallel administrative system comprising courts, jails, recruiting offices for militants and taxation policies that are routinely enforced. Madressahs where youngsters are radicalised are reportedly mushrooming under the watchful eye of Taliban and Al Qaeda security forces.
This parallel system poses a direct threat to the Pakistani government and offers a glimpse into a future where militant networks have been tolerated by our state for too long. For that reason, when it comes to North Waziristan, the question should not be: whose war is it anyway? It should be: can we ever claim victory against terrorism if militant networks thrive within our borders and offer a viable alternative to governance? The answer to the second question is a resounding no. Therefore, Pakistan should move into North Waziristan — but on its own timeline, not that of the US.
Source:dawn.com/
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