Afghan talks offer not for Mullah Omar: US

WASHINGTON: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Friday that while the United States backed the Taliban integration programme, the offer did not include the group’s top leadership.

Earlier, the Pentagon had expressed similar sentiments about the integration plan approved at a meeting of more than 60 nations in London on Thursday.

Secretary Clinton, who also attended the conference, told America’s National Public Radio network that she understood the military action alone was not enough to win the war in Afghanistan but the London peace proposal was not meant for senior Taliban leaders.

In her interview to NPR, Mrs Clinton acknowledged that most modern conflicts don’t end with a victory on the field of battle and therefore political and development work was essential.

“I think everyone has realised, as we did in Iraq, that you have to begin to go right at the insurgents and peel those off who are willing to renounce violence, renounce Al Qaeda, agree to live by the laws and constitution of Afghanistan and re-enter society,” Mrs Clinton said.

“That is not going to happen with (Taliban chief) Mullah Omar and the like,” she added. “But there are so many fighters in the Taliban that are there, frankly, because it’s a way to make a living in a country where the Taliban pay them more than they can make as a farmer or in some other line of work out in the countryside.”

Earlier, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell told a briefing in Washington that the US government was still working to figure out which mid-level Taliban officials it might be possible to integrate into the current Afghan political structure.

He said that top Taliban figures, like the country’s former leader Mullah Omar, would probably be what he called “a bridge too far”.

“Omar is probably the extreme,” said Mr Morrell. “The foot-soldiers are probably the other extreme. The question is what happens to the others. Can they be won over? Can they become a part of the political fabric? And that’s, I think, what we’re all trying to figure out. And I don’t know that we have an answer yet.”

Secretary Clinton’s remarks came a day after Afghan President Hamid Karzai told the London conference that he planned to convene a grand Jirga and invite low-level Taliban militants and “disenchanted brothers who are not part of Al Qaeda or other terrorist networks”.

Secretary Clinton claimed that there had already been some progress on reintegration. “There already have been Taliban who have left,” she said, adding that how the reconciliation process evolved “will be a little bit like jazz … we can’t lay it out completely”.

The secretary, however, insisted that the shift in policy towards accommodation of some fighters did not constitute an exit strategy; instead, it was one element of a comprehensive plan.

“You have to have a very tough-minded attitude about this. This is not sweetness and light,” the secretary of state said. “You’re dealing with a very difficult, complex phenomenon.”

In response to a recent remark by Mr Karzai that he expected western troops to be in Afghanistan for the next decade, Mrs Clinton said she did not think “most western troops will be in a combat role”.

“It won’t be like today, where we are putting in thousands more troops, 30,000 from our own and from other countries,” she said.

In Washington, other US officials told the media that it was up to the Afghan government to decide which Taliban leaders could be integrated.

But the Pentagon spokesman said he expected officials in Kabul to make their decisions in consultation with US President Barack Obama.

Mr Morrell indicated that senior Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar who, in his words, “has the blood of thousands of Americans on his hands”, would likely not be acceptable candidates for “reintegration”.

On Tuesday, the United Nations announced it had removed five former Taliban officials, including a former foreign minister, from its list of terrorists, ending restrictions on their travel and bank accounts. That could be a first step toward involving them in a reconciliation process.

Source:dawn.com

Clinton leaves for London conference on Afghanistan

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has left for London to attend the crucial conference on Afghanistan to be attended by over 60 countries, including India which will be represented by Foreign Minister S M Krishna.



"This conference is about further understanding what (Afghan) President (Hamid) Karzai plans to do as he continues to form his government," Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs P J Crowley said.



"It will be about reviewing various milestones and metrics that we are going to put in place so that we can, in fact, help the Afghan Government move forward with its ability to deliver services to its people," he said.



Crowley said at the conference there will be efforts in terms of how the international community is going to be better coordinated, particularly on the civilian side of these reconstruction efforts.
Source:indianexpress.com/

Comment: Obama’s Afghan Strategy —Zafar Hilaly

The threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban, the Jihadis and al Qaeda to Pakistan, though serious, is not of a magnitude that cannot be contained and rolled back. Indeed that is happening

Obama’s election was a miraculous event. The Americans did not believe it could happen. Another miracle will be needed if his Afghan strategy is to succeed. But because Obama achieved a miracle once, some believe that he can make it happen again.

In his speech on Tuesday Obama outlined an escalation of forces — 30,000 — and their exit simultaneously; to expand the war and to shut it down; to send more troops but promise not to send more even if the situation deteriorates; in other words to say yes and no.

Paradoxes are infectious. Pakistan too does not want a US pullout but neither do we want a US surge because that will drive the insurgents into Pakistan; we do not want to fight the Afghan Taliban but wish to crush the Pakistani variety although they are from the same genre and, for some, inseparable. The Taliban too want to have their cake and eat it too. They do not wish to fight the Pakistan Army but, according to Ahmed Rashid, want their Pakistani brothers in arms to clear the Army out of the NWFP so that their base areas could expand. But for sheer fantasy nothing can beat the Europeans who, with the exception of the hapless British, actually want to win a war without fighting. The happy state, as Horace wrote, “Of getting the victors palm without the dust of racing”.

Admittedly, without contraries there can be no progression, but what the protagonists in the Afghan war desire is anything less then the marriage of heaven and hell, and that requires a miracle.

Conventional military doctrine has it that to win a war an occupation army needs 20 to 25 soldiers for every one thousand of the population. By this reckoning America would require 600,000 men to win in Afghanistan. Such a large number, what to speak of the financial cost ($800 billion?), are beyond America’s ability to raise or afford.

Nor can America tolerate a stalemate, for many reasons, not the least of which is the growing unpopularity of the war. The absurd notion that some fanatics can, notwithstanding all the precautions taken since 9/11, steal into the US from the Afghan badlands and hijack planes or explode bombs is far fetched. What is worse, it is considered reason enough for young Americans returning in body bags and innocent Afghans being carted off to improvised burial grounds. It smacks of Cheney’s “1 percent theory”, which asserted that if there was a 1 percent chance of a terrorist attack on the US, the source of the threat must be eliminated. A notion born out of arrogance and paranoia was paraded as policy.

Obama can beat up on the Taliban for a few more years and then offer some operational successes as a smoke screen to declare victory and withdraw. Alternatively, he may be able to kill or capture a high profile al Qaeda leader, perhaps even Osama and Al-Zawahari, if they are alive and in Afghanistan or Pakistan, and declare that the surge has been successful and the mission accomplished. This may earn Obama kudos with the American electorate but it will not change anything on the ground. There are Islamists and ultra-nationalist Muslims in every village in Afghanistan. Xenophobia existed in Afghanistan long before Bin Laden’s arrival (the Arabs of al Qaeda are pejoratively called ‘camels’ by the Taliban), and will continue much after the US’s departure.

Even a ‘negotiated’ departure and the semblance of a broad based government, as the end product of parleys, will have little impact because once the Americans leave it will be unenforceable. Negotiating with the Taliban is a tricky matter; compared to them an eel is like a leech. They do the opposite of what they promise and think nothing of it; Afghan history consists of a litany of broken promises, by the Afghan themselves, the British — the perfidious Albion — and the Russians. If the Durand line has survived it is not because a commitment given must be honoured but rather the inability to undo a commitment extracted.

In addition to the three US brigades that are reportedly being sent in response to McChrystal’s request, Obama is trying to inveigle the reluctant Europeans to send more troops. And last week in Washington, the Indian Prime Minister was feted, lavishly praised and induced with offers of every kind of cooperation, including full nuclear partner status and open ended access to America’s armoury, in return for his help in prising the US out of the Afghan bog: “The US and India have agreed to work jointly to deal with terrorism emanating from India’s neighbourhood and to defeat terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

While cooperation to thwart terrorism from one and all is welcome, the US should tread warily when it comes to co-opting India in any joint operation that involves Pakistan. General McChrystal’s sensible caution that India’s further involvement in Afghanistan is likely to prove a red rag to the Pakistani bull is worth heeding. Obama must know that the closer the US draws to India, the further it moves from Pakistan, and without Pakistan’s cooperation no solution is workable. Managing relations with a much disliked US is difficult enough for a Pakistani government. Keeping them on an even keel would be impossible if there is military collusion between India and the US in targeting Pakistani territory.

Terrorism is no doubt a global issue, but whether the Taliban or the Northern Alliance prevails in Afghanistan is not. It is an exclusively domestic concern of the Afghans. None of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan, what to speak of countries further afield, have the right to interfere. Besides, history has shown that interference begets interference.

Of course, the world and the US in particular are legitimately concerned whether an Afghanistan under the Taliban will again become a safe haven for al Qaeda. That obviously cannot be allowed to happen although, as Polk has pointed out, “The terrorists who attacked New York and Washington on September 11 were partly trained in the US and based mainly in Europe. Propaganda emanated from Afghanistan but the real work was done elsewhere. Terrorists can operate from anywhere.”

Will, therefore, the Taliban allow terrorists to set up shop again? And if they do will they want to endure the severance of trade and communication links between a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and the outside world? And, what is more, raids by coalition Special Forces against al Qaeda hideouts and the Taliban themselves, aided by Pakistan and others? In short, will the Taliban permit their al Qaeda guests to endanger the lives of their hosts for the sake of something as unavailing, nebulous and far-fetched as a world Islamic Caliphate? Will the Taliban once again be willing to commit political suicide assuming, that is, if they manage to conquer Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan after the US leaves, by itself a tall ask?

One thinks not, because the Taliban are not mad and if they appear to be from another planet they nevertheless bleed like those on earth. Besides, why has the eminently sane Holbrooke said that he could negotiate with madmen? The Taliban too must have their lucid moments.

By letting the dust settle where it will in Afghanistan and by forswearing interference, a great deal of turmoil can be avoided. Instead we are warned that civil war will follow a US withdrawal; tens of thousands of casualties would result; Afghan refugees would flood Pakistan; the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda would run rampant; Pakistani generals would cave in to the Taliban and lose control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal; Islamic violence would overtake India; an Indo-Pak war would take place and quickly go nuclear, and al Qaeda would attack Britain and the US (Steve Coll: The New Yorker).

Similar disasters were predicted for the free world if North Vietnam was allowed to prevail over the South. Many had sleepless nights wondering which ‘domino’ was to fall next once Saigon was evacuated. As it happened 53,000 Americans died only to prevent what did not and could not happen.

The threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban, the Jihadis and al Qaeda to Pakistan, though serious, is not of a magnitude that cannot be contained and rolled back. Indeed that is happening. The American presence in Afghanistan is of no help, rather the contrary. What would help is financial support and access to markets. Pakistan will win, not because it is winning but because it wants to win and that’s what counts.

The writer is a former ambassador

Source: dailytimes.com.pk/