Pakistan's security establishment, which wields influence over the Afghan Taliban, says it is ready to facilitate talks to end the Afghanistan conflict in return for greater US backing in its competition with India for regional influence.
A former Pakistani intelligence officer familiar with the Taliban said: "If the world wants our very active involvement in not just bringing the Taliban to the table but keeping them at the table, our security challenges have to be acknowledged."
General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, has said political contacts between the Kabul government and the Taliban might be the best way to end the conflict.
While most analysts say the prospect of high-level talks between Kabul and the Taliban is remote, his comments reflect a view gaining currency among US policymakers that some form of power-sharing might be the most viable exit strategy for the US. Robert Gates, US defence secretary, has said the Taliban is part of Afghanistan's "political fabric."
A federal minister in Islamabad echoed Pakistan's fears that a fresh influx of 30,000 US troops might drive more Taliban fighters into Pakistan.
"We know they are not a popular force," he said. "The Afghans will probably never give them a majority in parliament. But with Pakistan's help and only with Pakistan's help, the return of the Taliban to the political high table will be a far more stabilising development for Afghanistan than . . . [a US] surge."
Renewed discussion of the possibility of a negotiated settlement presents an opportunity for Pakistan's intelligence services, which were instrumental in the creation of the Afghan Taliban in the mid-1990s, to reassert their potential for US foreign policy objectives in the region.
Elements in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency are regarded as the gatekeepers to the Taliban leadership, believed to be based in Pakistan.
Pakistan has had an amb-iguous relationship with the US since 2001, allowing Nato supplies across its territory and extending tacit endorsement to strikes by US drones on its territory. But the military has resis-ted US pressure to broaden an offensive against its own militant groups to include Afghan insurgent groups based in Pakistan havens.
Pakistani security officials see the US tendency towards favouring negotiations as a way to leverage their country's ties to the Taliban to wring greater concessions from Washington. Those would concern a range of policy issues, most notably its rivalry with India over Kashmir and for influence in Afghanistan.
Source:Pakistan's security establishment, which wields influence over the Afghan Taliban, says it is ready to facilitate talks to end the Afghanistan conflict in return for greater US backing in its competition with India for regional influence.
A former Pakistani intelligence officer familiar with the Taliban said: "If the world wants our very active involvement in not just bringing the Taliban to the table but keeping them at the table, our security challenges have to be acknowledged."
General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, has said political contacts between the Kabul government and the Taliban might be the best way to end the conflict.
While most analysts say the prospect of high-level talks between Kabul and the Taliban is remote, his comments reflect a view gaining currency among US policymakers that some form of power-sharing might be the most viable exit strategy for the US. Robert Gates, US defence secretary, has said the Taliban is part of Afghanistan's "political fabric."
A federal minister in Islamabad echoed Pakistan's fears that a fresh influx of 30,000 US troops might drive more Taliban fighters into Pakistan.
"We know they are not a popular force," he said. "The Afghans will probably never give them a majority in parliament. But with Pakistan's help and only with Pakistan's help, the return of the Taliban to the political high table will be a far more stabilising development for Afghanistan than . . . [a US] surge."
Renewed discussion of the possibility of a negotiated settlement presents an opportunity for Pakistan's intelligence services, which were instrumental in the creation of the Afghan Taliban in the mid-1990s, to reassert their potential for US foreign policy objectives in the region.
Elements in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency are regarded as the gatekeepers to the Taliban leadership, believed to be based in Pakistan.
Pakistan has had an amb-iguous relationship with the US since 2001, allowing Nato supplies across its territory and extending tacit endorsement to strikes by US drones on its territory. But the military has resis-ted US pressure to broaden an offensive against its own militant groups to include Afghan insurgent groups based in Pakistan havens.
Pakistani security officials see the US tendency towards favouring negotiations as a way to leverage their country's ties to the Taliban to wring greater concessions from Washington. Those would concern a range of policy issues, most notably its rivalry with India over Kashmir and for influence in Afghanistan.
Showing posts with label 2nd US drone. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2nd US drone. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Senate body wants immediate end to drone strikes
ISLAMABAD: The US government should immediately stop drone strikes in Pakistan, the Parliamentary Special Committee on National Security said on Friday.
Senator Raza presented the committee’s recommendations in the Senate for the forthcoming January 28 international conference in London on US President Barack Obama’s new Pak-Afghan strategy. In its recommendation, the committee suggessted transparently regulating foreign private security contractors under Pakistani laws. It called for no compromise over Pakistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, or nuclear programme.
The committee observed peace in Afghanistan was necessary for regional stability and emphasised a permanent regional plan. It called for mutual respect between Afghanistan and Pakistan and resumption of a bilateral Jirga process and parliamentary, media and cultural exchanges.
The committee recommended the two governments make efforts to prevent the use of each other’s soil for terrorist activities. It voiced its concern over the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan, saying that constituted a strategic threat to Pakistan. It recommended that Islamabad should facilitate the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. The committee called for resumption of composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. It stressed the dialogue process should include the Kashmir dispute’s settlement in accordance with UN resolutions and according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
Source:dailytimes.com.pk/
Senator Raza presented the committee’s recommendations in the Senate for the forthcoming January 28 international conference in London on US President Barack Obama’s new Pak-Afghan strategy. In its recommendation, the committee suggessted transparently regulating foreign private security contractors under Pakistani laws. It called for no compromise over Pakistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, or nuclear programme.
The committee observed peace in Afghanistan was necessary for regional stability and emphasised a permanent regional plan. It called for mutual respect between Afghanistan and Pakistan and resumption of a bilateral Jirga process and parliamentary, media and cultural exchanges.
The committee recommended the two governments make efforts to prevent the use of each other’s soil for terrorist activities. It voiced its concern over the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan, saying that constituted a strategic threat to Pakistan. It recommended that Islamabad should facilitate the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. The committee called for resumption of composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. It stressed the dialogue process should include the Kashmir dispute’s settlement in accordance with UN resolutions and according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people.
Source:dailytimes.com.pk/
UN eases sanctions on five Taliban leaders
The UN said the five would no longer be subject to international travel bans and a freeze on their assets.
The men include Abdul Wakil Mutawakil, who was a foreign minister when the Taleban were in power in Afghanistan.
Earlier, President Hamid Karzai called for removal of Taleban names from the UN list in a bid to reach out to them.
And Nato's top commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal had also expressed hope for a negotiated peace with the Taliban.
The UN Security Council panel decision comes days before an international conference on Afghanistan to be held in London.
'Gesture of support'
The panel "approved the deletion (de-listing) of the five entries" from its blacklist of individuals subjected to a travel ban, assets freeze and arms embargo, the UN said in a statement.
The five men are former members of the Taliban government, and were put on the UN blacklist in 2001.
They were not active insurgents and there had already been debate within the UN sanctions committee on whether to remove them from the list.
Source:bbc.co.uk
Kept out of Afghan meet, India lodges protest with Turkey
New Delhi has lodged a protest with Ankara for keeping it out of the Afghanistan security conference in Istanbul, apparently at the behest of Islamabad. This may cast a shadow over Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to India next fortnight. Gul, the organiser of the conference, is on a two-day visit to India from February 9 after which he will leave for Dhaka.
India, France and Japan, all of whom have a substantial stake in stabilising Kabul, had protested to Ankara for not being invited to the conference to mull over the military and political future of Afghanistan. Paris and Tokyo were squeezed in at the last moment with New Delhi being left out in the cold.
The highest levels of the UPA government are upset at the Ankara snub as Turkey tilted towards Pakistani plan of keeping the conference at first confined to the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan and then shutting the door on India. This is despite the fact that Russia had invited Indian MEA officials for a separate Afghanistan conference in Moscow on January 25 and the United Kingdom has invited Foreign Minister S M Krishna to attend the London conference on January 28.
Source:indianexpress.com/
India, France and Japan, all of whom have a substantial stake in stabilising Kabul, had protested to Ankara for not being invited to the conference to mull over the military and political future of Afghanistan. Paris and Tokyo were squeezed in at the last moment with New Delhi being left out in the cold.
The highest levels of the UPA government are upset at the Ankara snub as Turkey tilted towards Pakistani plan of keeping the conference at first confined to the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan and then shutting the door on India. This is despite the fact that Russia had invited Indian MEA officials for a separate Afghanistan conference in Moscow on January 25 and the United Kingdom has invited Foreign Minister S M Krishna to attend the London conference on January 28.
Source:indianexpress.com/
Editorial: Summitry on Afghanistan
In a concentrated burst of diplomatic activity, a series of
summits has taken place, is taking place as these lines are being written, and will take place after they appear in print. On Monday, a trilateral summit amongst Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan transpired in Istanbul, hosted by Turkish President Abdullah Gul and attended by the Pakistani and Afghan presidents. On Tuesday, Pakistan’s six plus two formula would be applied for a summit of Afghanistan’s neighbours, also in Istanbul. On Wednesday, the much hyped and anticipated conference on Afghanistan in London would get underway. In the second summit in Istanbul, Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, would be represented. In addition, the US will be in attendance, and in a substitution for the original invitee Russia, the UK. At the London conference, around 50 countries will be participating. All this shows the increasing focus on, and increased activity to find ways of resolution of, the Afghan conflict.
The thrust of most opinion on the issue centres on the possibility of opening a dialogue with, and welcoming in from the cold, mid-level Taliban fighters, considered to be less ideologically motivated and perhaps fighting for money or to avenge grievances against the Karzai government, the foreign forces supporting that government, or the warlords who form the warp and woof of the incumbent Kabul regime. The terms on which such fighters may be welcomed back and rehabilitated in Afghan society include a renunciation of their past proclivities and views, an acceptance of the Afghan constitution and political setup, and an avowed farewell to arms. A great deal of the hopes residing in this initiative spring from the fact that resources will now be made available to Kabul to sweeten the return of such fighters with jobs, homes, security against former enemies, etc. The Obama ‘surge’ of some 30,000 fresh troops is intended to weaken the hold of the Taliban insurgency, secure the cities, population centres and main highways, and thereby persuade even the leadership of the Taliban that their struggle does not have any hope of succeeding in its objectives by force of arms. That development, it is hoped, will open the door to negotiations with the Taliban leadership on seeking a political solution to the Afghan quagmire. There are unprecedented hints of late that Mullah Omar may be shifting ground slightly to envisage accepting the demand that the Taliban distance themselves from al Qaeda, but he remains adamant that the other side must commit to a withdrawal of all foreign forces, without necessarily being forthcoming on the issue of accepting the Afghan constitution or political order.
These diplomatic, political shifts have been made possible in recent days because of Saudi Arabia’s mediation between the Taliban and the Karzai regime, through discreet contacts hosted by the Kingdom since the last two years. Whereas Pakistan’s ISI has been left out of this loop at the insistence of the hosts and the two sides of this coin, the redoubtable intelligence arm of the Pakistani military now feels even more confident of calling the shots in any negotiated settlement in Afghanistan because of its closeness to the Afghan Taliban, whose leadership and fighters are hosted on Pakistani soil. The ISI’s insistence, according to reports, that it alone will mediate between the Taliban and the US and Afghan authorities, without permitting direct contacts between the warring sides, may be read as an attempt to ensure that Pakistan’s oft-touted but little explained ‘national security interests’ in Afghanistan are safeguarded. Reading between the lines reveals that the Pakistani military establishment still harbours apprehensions and a horror of the possibility of growing Indian influence in Kabul squeezing Pakistan in a ‘nutcracker’ between a hostile India to the east and a less than friendly Afghanistan under Indian influence to the west. This paranoia may put a spanner in the works of the London conference, where the US and UK are pressing for an increased role for India in any eventual settlement of the Afghan imbroglio, a notion rejected in toto by the Pakistani military establishment and which is arguably being worked against by the two summits in Istanbul, where India is not represented.
The notion of a regional solution to Afghanistan’s woes sounds fine in theory, and as far as its immediate neighbours and the chief architects of a political settlement allowing the US and Nato forces to withdraw at some future date, i.e. the US and UK are concerned, poses better prospects of success. The fly in the ointment is Pakistan’s opposition to opening the door further to an Indian role, the rock on which the London conference and all similar initiatives beloved of the west may make shipwreck. *
Second Editorial: Quetta police protests
What happened in Quetta on Monday is condemnable to say
the least. The provincial capital presented a scene of complete lawlessness in which there was no one to protect the life and property or citizens. Hundreds of police officials coursed the main roads and streets of the Quetta city in a rally that had started from Police Lines. Their first destination was the Chief Minister’s House where they chanted slogans against the government and forcibly entered the premises. Their demand: an increase in the salaries of the Balochistan Police at par with the police force in other provinces. On not finding the chief minister there, they went to the Governor’s House and repeated their act. The governor ensured protesting police cadres that he would talk to the provincial government to get their grievances addressed. But there was no pacifying the rebellious law enforcers, who then thought it wise to block roads, hold sit-ins in various parts of the city, burn tyres, resort to aerial firing and harass journalists and ordinary citizens alike. This was the least one expected from a disciplined law enforcement body like the police.
The swiftness with which the provincial government has acted against this open rebellion is laudable. The Capital City Police Chief of Quetta as well as Deputy Inspector General (Operations) have been removed from their posts and ordered to report to Services and General Administration Department (S&DAG). Regional police officers of Sibi and Khuzdar have been given the additional charge of these posts respectively. One cannot but agree with the Chief Minister of Balochistan Nawab Mohammad Aslam Raisani’s statement that when the guardians of the law blow it to smithereens, they do not deserve any leniency. It is hoped that the government would live up to its resolve and not allow leeway to the culprits during proceedings against them. In addition to a thorough departmental inquiry into the incident, criminal cases against officials responsible for inciting protests and violence should set an example for the rest. While the government suppresses this rebellion quickly and effectively, it should also work towards meeting the just demands of the Balochistan Police. There is no denying that in a province that suffers from a difficult law and order situation and where the police face targeted killings by disgruntled Baloch insurgents, meagre salaries and other compensations serve to lower the morale of the force. The government should not allow the discontent in its prime law enforcement agency to fester. *
Source:dailytimes.com.pk/
summits has taken place, is taking place as these lines are being written, and will take place after they appear in print. On Monday, a trilateral summit amongst Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan transpired in Istanbul, hosted by Turkish President Abdullah Gul and attended by the Pakistani and Afghan presidents. On Tuesday, Pakistan’s six plus two formula would be applied for a summit of Afghanistan’s neighbours, also in Istanbul. On Wednesday, the much hyped and anticipated conference on Afghanistan in London would get underway. In the second summit in Istanbul, Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, would be represented. In addition, the US will be in attendance, and in a substitution for the original invitee Russia, the UK. At the London conference, around 50 countries will be participating. All this shows the increasing focus on, and increased activity to find ways of resolution of, the Afghan conflict.
The thrust of most opinion on the issue centres on the possibility of opening a dialogue with, and welcoming in from the cold, mid-level Taliban fighters, considered to be less ideologically motivated and perhaps fighting for money or to avenge grievances against the Karzai government, the foreign forces supporting that government, or the warlords who form the warp and woof of the incumbent Kabul regime. The terms on which such fighters may be welcomed back and rehabilitated in Afghan society include a renunciation of their past proclivities and views, an acceptance of the Afghan constitution and political setup, and an avowed farewell to arms. A great deal of the hopes residing in this initiative spring from the fact that resources will now be made available to Kabul to sweeten the return of such fighters with jobs, homes, security against former enemies, etc. The Obama ‘surge’ of some 30,000 fresh troops is intended to weaken the hold of the Taliban insurgency, secure the cities, population centres and main highways, and thereby persuade even the leadership of the Taliban that their struggle does not have any hope of succeeding in its objectives by force of arms. That development, it is hoped, will open the door to negotiations with the Taliban leadership on seeking a political solution to the Afghan quagmire. There are unprecedented hints of late that Mullah Omar may be shifting ground slightly to envisage accepting the demand that the Taliban distance themselves from al Qaeda, but he remains adamant that the other side must commit to a withdrawal of all foreign forces, without necessarily being forthcoming on the issue of accepting the Afghan constitution or political order.
These diplomatic, political shifts have been made possible in recent days because of Saudi Arabia’s mediation between the Taliban and the Karzai regime, through discreet contacts hosted by the Kingdom since the last two years. Whereas Pakistan’s ISI has been left out of this loop at the insistence of the hosts and the two sides of this coin, the redoubtable intelligence arm of the Pakistani military now feels even more confident of calling the shots in any negotiated settlement in Afghanistan because of its closeness to the Afghan Taliban, whose leadership and fighters are hosted on Pakistani soil. The ISI’s insistence, according to reports, that it alone will mediate between the Taliban and the US and Afghan authorities, without permitting direct contacts between the warring sides, may be read as an attempt to ensure that Pakistan’s oft-touted but little explained ‘national security interests’ in Afghanistan are safeguarded. Reading between the lines reveals that the Pakistani military establishment still harbours apprehensions and a horror of the possibility of growing Indian influence in Kabul squeezing Pakistan in a ‘nutcracker’ between a hostile India to the east and a less than friendly Afghanistan under Indian influence to the west. This paranoia may put a spanner in the works of the London conference, where the US and UK are pressing for an increased role for India in any eventual settlement of the Afghan imbroglio, a notion rejected in toto by the Pakistani military establishment and which is arguably being worked against by the two summits in Istanbul, where India is not represented.
The notion of a regional solution to Afghanistan’s woes sounds fine in theory, and as far as its immediate neighbours and the chief architects of a political settlement allowing the US and Nato forces to withdraw at some future date, i.e. the US and UK are concerned, poses better prospects of success. The fly in the ointment is Pakistan’s opposition to opening the door further to an Indian role, the rock on which the London conference and all similar initiatives beloved of the west may make shipwreck. *
Second Editorial: Quetta police protests
What happened in Quetta on Monday is condemnable to say
the least. The provincial capital presented a scene of complete lawlessness in which there was no one to protect the life and property or citizens. Hundreds of police officials coursed the main roads and streets of the Quetta city in a rally that had started from Police Lines. Their first destination was the Chief Minister’s House where they chanted slogans against the government and forcibly entered the premises. Their demand: an increase in the salaries of the Balochistan Police at par with the police force in other provinces. On not finding the chief minister there, they went to the Governor’s House and repeated their act. The governor ensured protesting police cadres that he would talk to the provincial government to get their grievances addressed. But there was no pacifying the rebellious law enforcers, who then thought it wise to block roads, hold sit-ins in various parts of the city, burn tyres, resort to aerial firing and harass journalists and ordinary citizens alike. This was the least one expected from a disciplined law enforcement body like the police.
The swiftness with which the provincial government has acted against this open rebellion is laudable. The Capital City Police Chief of Quetta as well as Deputy Inspector General (Operations) have been removed from their posts and ordered to report to Services and General Administration Department (S&DAG). Regional police officers of Sibi and Khuzdar have been given the additional charge of these posts respectively. One cannot but agree with the Chief Minister of Balochistan Nawab Mohammad Aslam Raisani’s statement that when the guardians of the law blow it to smithereens, they do not deserve any leniency. It is hoped that the government would live up to its resolve and not allow leeway to the culprits during proceedings against them. In addition to a thorough departmental inquiry into the incident, criminal cases against officials responsible for inciting protests and violence should set an example for the rest. While the government suppresses this rebellion quickly and effectively, it should also work towards meeting the just demands of the Balochistan Police. There is no denying that in a province that suffers from a difficult law and order situation and where the police face targeted killings by disgruntled Baloch insurgents, meagre salaries and other compensations serve to lower the morale of the force. The government should not allow the discontent in its prime law enforcement agency to fester. *
Source:dailytimes.com.pk/
On Taliban/AQ ties and the Afghanistan exit strategy
Vahid Brown at the CTC Sentinel has a new article (pdf document) out arguing that the relationship between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden before 9/11 was considerably more fractious than it was made out to be. The main source of argument was between the Taliban’s Afghan nationalist agenda and bin Laden’s view of global jihad, and in particular his determination to attack the United States, he says.
Based on an account by an insider, he challenges the assumption that bin Laden personally swore an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar. The account by Egyptian jihadist Mustafa Hamid, better known as Abul-Walid al-Masri, was first published in jihadist forums in 2007 but gained little attention outside specialist websites.
Given the groundswell of talk this week about the possibility of an eventual peace deal with the Taliban it is worth reading closely in the light of the debate about whether they can be prised away from al Qaeda (bin Laden’s son says in this interview with Reuters that there is little love lost between the Taliban and OBL).
Brown notes that Abul-Walid is a Taliban loyalist and his claims should be treated with caution. However the apparent endorsement of his views by the Taliban would suggest that whether or not his account of a Taliban/al Qaeda rift is accurate, they cast light on how the Taliban chooses to project itself today.
“He (Abul Walid) writes that relations between the Taliban and the Arab jihadists in Afghanistan had become more contentious during that year (1998), primarily on account of the escalation of al-Qaeda’s media and operational campaign against the United States. From the outset, the Taliban’s provision of hospitality for the al-Qaeda leadership was limited by two conditions: bin Laden was not to communicate with the media without the consent of the Taliban regime, nor was he to directly antagonize the United States,” says Brown.
“A number of the Arab jihadist leaders rose in opposition to bin Laden at this time,” he quotes Abul-Walid as saying, “all of them affirming the primacy of the domestic fronts against the Arab regimes, convinced that a shift to a ‘global confrontation’ against the United States was ill conceived.”
With the relationship between Mullah Omar and bin Laden “worsening by the day”, the al Qaeda leader was supposed to take an oath of allegiance to the Afghan Taliban leader to end the rift. Bin Laden however at first procrastinated, and then sent Abul-Walid to make a vow of allegiance on his behalf – an ambiguous act of proxy that would later allow him to either deny or aver having made the oath depending on which suited him best.
Of the preparation for 9/11, Abul Walid writes, “Mullah Omar topped the list of those kept in the dark, though it was on his head that all of the catastrophic consequences of that strike would fall, as his regime collapsed along with the Twin Towers of New York. ” The oath of allegiance “turned out to have been an outright deception of the Commander of the Faithful (Mullah Omar), diverting his attention from a dangerous act, plotted behind his back, that undermined his fundamental prerogatives as ruler of the country and threatened the lives and fates of all Afghans.”
Brown concludes that the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban may be similar even today, with the former using the latter out of expedience while pursuing policies counter to its own interests.
“In many ways, the Afghan Taliban remain as dependent on support from Pakistan as they were prior to 9/11. Yet it is against this very patron, and under a Taliban banner, that al-Qaeda and its coalition of Pakistani jihadists are waging a bloody campaign of suicide terrorism. Mullah Omar has flatly condemned this campaign, telling his purported “followers” in Pakistan’s tribal areas that they are “bringing a bad name” to the Taliban and “harming the war against the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
“The ‘Commander of the Faithful,’ however, has proven unable to command these particular faithful, and the violence in Pakistan’s cities rages on. This says less about the limits of Mullah Omar’s authority than it does about the expedient nature of the allegiances that al-Qaeda and its partners profess. To achieve its objectives in the region, the policy community must strive for a more nuanced understanding of these allegiances, the purposes they serve, and the underlying tensions they conceal.”
The arguments about whether the Taliban can be prised away from al Qaeda have raged pretty much since 9/11 — from those who say that the United States should have tried to do so more effectively before it launched its war in Afghanistan, to those who argue that the war itself has driven the two closer together.
Until quite recently, the debate has remained largely within the domain of specialists. The new focus, however, on an eventual exit strategy for Afghanistan – in which a display of strength on the part of U.S.-led forces is supposed to help pave the way for a longer term peace deal - makes these details about the Taliban very relevant today.
Do also read Ahmed Rashid in the New York Review of Books on a possible deal with the Taliban.
In his view, recent public statements by Mullah Omar have signalled a greater willingness to negotiate:
“The Taliban’s new tone can be traced to secret talks in the spring of 2009. Sponsored by Saudi Arabia at (Afghan President Hamid) Karzai’s request, the talks included former (or now retired) Taliban, former Arab members of al-Qaeda, and Karzai’s representatives. No breakthrough took place, but the talks led to a series of visits to Saudi Arabia by important Taliban leaders during the rest of 2009. The US, British, and Saudi officials who were indirectly in contact with the Taliban there quickly encouraged them to renounce al-Qaeda and lay out their negotiating demands. In turn, the Taliban said that distancing themselves from al-Qaeda would require the other side to meet a principal demand of their own: that all foreign forces must announce a timetable to leave Afghanistan.”
Pakistan, he says, is pushing for a major – indeed exclusive role – for its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency in brokering any talks.
“How will the Taliban leaders respond? Many of them are fed up with years of ISI manipulation and strategizing on their behalf and would prefer to keep the ISI out of such talks. Some members of the Taliban have built up a rapport with Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security, the domestic intelligence agency of the Kabul government. The NDS and the ISI loathe and mistrust each other, and the NDS would be extremely reluctant to allow the ISI a central part in negotiations. Moreover the crucial acceptance of reconciliation with the Taliban has to come from the non-Pashtun population in the north who are extremely hostile to the Taliban and the ISI. If the northern ethnic groups who make up just over 50 percent of the population do not accept the reconciliation plan, there could be a renewed civil war as in the 1990s.
“But the ISI has power and influence over the Taliban. Not only are the Taliban able to resupply their fighters from Pakistan, and seek medical treatment and other facilities, but the families of most Taliban leaders live in Pakistan where they own homes and run businesses and shops. Taliban leaders travel to Saudi Arabia on Pakistani passports. All this makes them vulnerable to ISI pressure. Even before the US military can consider coopting mid-level Taliban commanders, both sides would have to ascertain how this would play with the ISI.”
It is impossible to believe that the United States and its allies would be willing to hand over exclusive control of any talks with the Taliban to the ISI. From Pakistan’s point of view, it would be unlikely to want to deliver on any peace deal unless it is convinced its own interests are taken care of – including reassurances both about India’s growing presence in Afghanistan, and the security of its own border with Afghanistan - never recognised by Kabul even under the former Taliban regime. India, with memories of Afghanistan being used as a base for Kashmiri militant groups before 9/11, would look warily at any deal with the Taliban which appeared to reassert Pakistan’s influence there.
So there is a long way to go yet. But you might just about be able to argue that after nearly a decade of war (or far longer in the case of Afghanistan), an end may be in sight.
Source:blogs.reuters.com/
Taliban claim downing 2nd US drone
ISLAMABAD (NNI) - Taliban on Tuesday claimed that they have shot down another US drone in the country’s North Waziristan tribal region.
It is the second US drone aircraft to have shot down in the same region during the last four days.
Tribesmen said that the second drone was shot down late Monday night and the wreckage fell in Afghan side of the border. The militants used anti-aircraft missiles from a mobile launcher to hit the unmanned aircraft, a tribal elder said by phone from Miranshah, the centre of North Waziristan.
Tribesmen Monday announced to gift a car to the tribesman who had shot down the US drone aircraft on January 23.
Source:nation.com.pk/
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